Most companies have services like employee login portals, internal-only subdomains, and test servers they would prefer to keep private. Red teams and white hat hackers can find these obscure and often vulnerable services using a tool designed to help protect users from fraudulent certificates.
Certificates are issued to companies operating online services by a certificate authority to protect users from being directed to fraudulent websites. In 2011, limitations in the ability of certificates to protect users were demonstrated by attacks against certificate authority companies Comodo and DigiNotar. Because it took a long time for the fraudulent certificates to be discovered, certificate trust logs were created to provide better transparency for users.
Facebook has used CT logs to discover mis-issued TLS certificates and stop them from being used to intercept HTTPS traffic. This success prompted them to release a CT log tool to the public, with the ability to "subscribe" to a domain to quickly see certificates issued to it.
Ironically, releasing this tool led directly to several bug bounty reports in which Facebook test servers that didn't have the same permission checks as production servers were discovered, potentially leading to free access to all kinds of information. This perfectly illustrates how CT trust logs can reveal an unintended amount of information at the company while intending to detect domains using fraudulent certificates.
- Don't Miss: How to Use SpiderFoot for OSINT Gathering
Hidden subdomains can reveal hidden pages like employee logins, web applications in use, internal-only domains that can only be visited from an internal DNS, and old or deleted domains. While we can use Facebook's CT monitoring tool online to find hidden subdomains, we'll be using a local tool for more anonymity. It's called CT-exposer, a Python OSINT scanner that's easy to run on any platform. It won't show us much data as Facebook's tool does, nor provide as many results, but the information is much easier to wade through.
To get started using CT-exposer, you'll need to make sure Python3 is installed on your computer. If you don't have it, you can download it from the Python.org website. Once you have Python installed, you can ensure you have the right version by typing python3 into a terminal window. If the output looks similar to the below output, you should be good. You can type quit() after the >>> to exit.
python3 Python 3.6.4 (v3.6.4:d48ecebad5, Dec 18 2017, 21:07:28) [GCC 4.2.1 (Apple Inc. build 6996) (dot 3)] on husker Type "help", "copyright", "credits" or "license" for more information. >>> quit()
If you're running Kali Linux, make sure to update and upgrade your system as well with the following commands.
apt update apt upgrade
With Python installed and your system fully updated, you can begin by navigating to the GitHub page for CT-exposer. Once there, copy the URL under the clone or download button and run the git clone command in a terminal window, as such:
git clone https://github.com/chris408/ct-exposer.git
Once the files finish downloading, change directories to root, cd to the ct-exposer folder, then install the requirements, like this:
cd ct-exposer sudo pip3 install -r requirements.txt
Once the requirements are installed, you should be ready to go!
To begin exploring what CT logs can reveal, take a test domain and see what information can be revealed from an attacker's perspective. To start, try priceline.com.
The main URL for this nonsense is priceline.com, so run CT-exposer on the URL to see what you can find. Make sure you are in the ct-exposer folder. Once you're in the ct-exposer folder, you can run the following command to scan the certificate trust logs for the priceline.com domain.
python3 ct-exposer.py -d priceline.com
In the output below, we see the results of the priceline.com scan. Wow! There are a lot of results, but how could they be useful?
sudo python3 ct-exposer.py -d priceline.com [+]: Downloading domain list... [+]: Download of domain list complete. [+]: Parsed 33 domain(s) from list. [+]: Domains found: 188.8.131.52 admin.groupcommerce.com 184.108.40.206 app-install.priceline.com 220.127.116.11 appinstall.priceline.com 18.104.22.168 bomgar.corp.priceline.com 22.214.171.124 careers.priceline.com 126.96.36.199 cruises.priceline.com 188.8.131.52 dealreveal.corp.priceline.com 184.108.40.206 enet.qahotelportal.priceline.com 220.127.116.11 g.ssl.fastly.net 18.104.22.168 h.priceline.com 22.214.171.124 hsecure.priceline.com 126.96.36.199 mail.corp.priceline.com 188.8.131.52 media.priceline.com 184.108.40.206 phantom.corp.priceline.com 220.127.116.11 picme.priceline.com 18.104.22.168 priceline.map.fastly.net 22.214.171.124 qahotelportal.priceline.com 126.96.36.199 splunkes.corp.priceline.com 188.8.131.52 ssh.corp.priceline.com 184.108.40.206 travela.a1.qa.priceline.com 220.127.116.11 travela.priceline.com 18.104.22.168 www.a1.dev.priceline.com 22.214.171.124 www.a1.qa.priceline.com 126.96.36.199 www.a309.corp.priceline.com 188.8.131.52 www.b1.dev.priceline.com 184.108.40.206 www.priceline.com 220.127.116.11 www.qaa.priceline.com [+]: Domains with no DNS record: none enet.hotelportal.priceline.com none fs.corp.priceline.com none pcln04.corp.priceline.com none rsecure.priceline.com none secure.priceline.com
You can attempt to navigate to the various subdomains that appear. If they do not resolve, it can have one of several meanings.
See what happens when you attempt to access an internal service, as in a service you have to be connected to an internal DNS server to access. For instance, if you attempt to navigate to mail.corp.priceline.com from your web browser, you're met with the following.
This is different than what you see when the page you're trying to go to does not exist. This does exist, you just can't see it on a public server. To a red team or an attacker, a piece of internal infrastructure was just discovered. A simple Nmap will show a Microsoft-IIS/8.5 server sitting at that address.
Some subdomains do resolve and aren't that secret at all. However, to an attacker, knowing about this can let you make an early pass to explore a possible avenue of attack.
For one example, you see a careers subdomain at careers.priceline.com. As an attacker, I've just learned what kind of resume I need to copy and drop into these job postings to get the attention of an HR employee at Priceline. Maybe I can even get them to open a PDF resume with an exploit, but even if they use an outsourced hiring company, I can learn about the physical locations they operate from and the type of systems they use by carefully reading the job requirements.
By following the subdomain breadcrumbs, you can continue to discover subdomains where the DNS does resolve. Another example, h.priceline.com, which resolves to an insecure website with a very old copyright date. The page talks about a bunch of services they either no longer offer or advertise.
Similarly, media.priceline.com does actually resolve, this time to a secure website using HTTPS for press like myself, but also last updated in 2014. I'm sure nothing has changed since then.
In some instances, the transportation layer security will be broken, and you'll get a big warning like that below when trying to resolve picme.priceline.com, for instance.
If you ignore it and proceed, you can see that the whole server is broken, giving an error message with more information about it. (Gee, thanks for the needless information.)
As you can see, there's an Apache 2.4.18 server sitting on an Ubuntu on port 443. Hmm, that seems kind of old. Go ahead and Google that exactly to see if there could be anything wrong. Surely the fortress of information that is priceline.com couldn't be exposing an old, vulnerable server to the internet.
Oh my god. There are 16 different vulnerabilities. In this case, you could just move on, assuming this is so riddled with issues that it's probably a honeypot. Wouldn't you feel bad kicking this poor thing?
Finally, there's the crown jewel of the discovery: employee login and application endpoints! These watering holes are where you can learn about the security of your targets and attempt to grab passwords. For example, when you attempt to resolve phantom.corp.priceline.com, you are greeted with the following page challenging for a login.
So, does this mean that Priceline is running a phantom corporation? In may feel like it but, in fact, these are just endpoints to things like email, hotel logins, and other services employees access from outside the Priceline network.
Here, the two important things you can learn are that Priceline is using okta.com for authentication and requires two-factor authentication through "Duo" security.
If I was an attacker, I now know that employees receive a push notification each time they log into a company resource on a new device. This means capturing usernames and passwords are useless without also capturing this authentication layer.
You will also likely have several domains which have no DNS record. This means you cannot navigate to them because no known route exists on the public internet. So what does this mean?
[+]: Domains with no DNS record: none enet.hotelportal.priceline.com none fs.corp.priceline.com none pcln04.corp.priceline.com none rsecure.priceline.com none secure.priceline.com
This means they are serviced by an internal DNS server or require you to be logged into a VPN to access. This makes these subdomains some of the most interesting of all, as they represent internal attack surfaces you do not yet have access to. They also act as targeting information for your initial attacks and a potential way of tricking employees into thinking they are on a private network when they are really on a public one.
If I were an attacker or red team, I'd start quietly purchasing phishing domains that were similar to the ones seen here, like secure.pricleine.com to attempt to trick employees into thinking they were logging into an internal service.
Abusing Certificate Trust Logs Can Reveal Hidden Information
In one short command, an attacker can take a glance at the available target surfaces and determine the best method of attack. In our example, you were able to assess internal and external target surfaces, evaluate individual employee-level security at the company, and identify different internal departments such as hiring which may have more lax security standards. You were also able to find old, internal, and outright vulnerable domains by simply navigating to the URLs you found CT logs for.
What a hacker might learn from this is that recon is a critical skill that doesn't have to be a hugely time-consuming endeavor. While CT-exposer should be just one tool in your arsenal, you can learn about the structure of a company's online presence with relative ease before choosing the perfect target.
I hope you enjoyed this guide to using CT-exposer to gather OSINT data on a target domain! If you have any questions about this tutorial on CT-exposer or you have a comment, feel free to reach me in the comments below or on Twitter @KodyKinzie.